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SUMMARY  
The following Thesis “Risk-Based Approach in the European Anti-Money Laundering 
Legislation: Origin, Benefits, and Implications” has the major objective of identifying the 
benefits and implications of the risk-based approach under the Third and the Fourth AML 
Directives. 
The Thesis has three research questions. First, it aims to discover why did the European AML 
regime shift from the rule-based approach to the risk-based approach. Second, it aims to identify 
which benefits and implications does the risk-based approach bring. Third, it analyses how does 
the transition to the risk-based approach affect customer identification. 
The methodology used in this Thesis rests on the comparative model: thus, each subsequent 
Directive is being compared with its predecessor. Subsequently, to show the impact of the AML 
laws on the customer identification in general and specifically on risk evaluation, a detailed 
explanation of risk categories as well as measures of risk assessment and mitigation would be 
discussed. Apart from qualitative data, quantitative data would be used, such as statistics, cost-
benefit estimations and risk assessment models. 
The Thesis is divided into eight Chapters, each devoted to a separate aspect of the research. 
Chapter 1 briefly outlines the concept of money laundering as well as explains the relevance of 
the topic. Chapter 2 is divided into three parts, unified by analysis of the First AML Directive. 
The first Section provides an examination of the 1990 FATF Recommendation, whereas the 
following Sections discuss the Directive’s background and scope as well as customer 
identification. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the Second AML Directive: it focuses on the 
FATF Eight Special Recommendation of 2001 and the extension of the scope. Chapter 4 
concludes the part on the rule-based approach, identifying its implications and emphasising its 
controversial character. Chapter 5 introduces the risk-based approach under the Third AML 
Directive and discusses the FATF Recommendations of 2003, background and scope of the 
Directive, customer due diligence, risk-sensitive categorisation, etc. It further highlights the 
strengths and the weaknesses of the Directive. Chapter 6 provides a discussion on advancing of 
the risk-based approach under the Fourth AML Directive. It analyses the amendments made and 
emphasises the legislative basis of the current European AML regime. Chapter 7 summarises the 
part on the risk-based approach as well as turns to the practical application of AML/CTF 
principles, such as risk-evaluation procedures and techniques used to provide the risk-based 
categorisation of the customer. Chapter 8 provides a brief discussion on the future development 
of the AML in the European Union.  
The conclusion provides the findings of the study, answering each of the research questions as 
well as offering a future prognosis of the European AML/CTF policy. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AML Anti-Money Laundering 
AMLD Anti-Money Laundering Directive 
AMLD1 Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
AMLD2 Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 
2001 amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering - Commission Declaration 
AMLD3 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 
2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering and terrorist financing 
AMLD4 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 
2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC 
CDD Customer Due Diligence 
CoE Council of Europe 
CTF Combating Terrorist Financing 
DD  Due Diligence 
DNFBP  Designated Non-Financial Business and Profession 
EDD  Enhanced Due Diligence 
EU  European Union 
FATF  Financial Action Task Force 
FIU  Financial Intelligence Unit 
KYC  Know Your Customer 
ML  Money Laundering 
NCCT  Non-Cooperative Country or Territories 
NPO  Non-Profit Organisation 
PEP  Politically Exposed Person 
SDD  Simplified Due Diligence 
TF  Terrorist Financing 
UN  United Nations 
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1. MONEY LAUNDERING: CONCEPTUAL INTRODUCTION 
Globalisation and the establishment of the common market resulted in businesses expanding their 
reach and going beyond the national borders, which, in turn, allowed goods, capital, technology, 
and information to move faster among the states. Integration made it possible to produce better, 
cheaper, and faster than ever before. Although the benefits of such a rapid development are self-
evident, new risks and challenges have emerged, especially in the financial system, as a 
consequence of the increase in the number of transactions and the reduction of the time required 
for their processing. As reported by the European Central Bank, the number of transactions in the 
EU increased from 48 billion to 112 billion in 2000 and 2016 respectively.1   
Growth of the globalised financial system enabled money launderers and criminals to inject 
proceeds of a crime in it and conceal their unlawful origin. Today, the issue of money laundering 
(ML) has become a major concern and is referred to as “a global problem requiring a global 
solution.”2 To fight this large-scale problem, the international community responded with 
numerous countermeasures, including strict financial and banking regulation, more flexible 
legislation and effective enforcement tools.3  
Due to historical and geographical reasons, Latvia has traditionally served and continues to serve 
as a bridge between the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Western world. 
Recently, considerable public attention has been directed to the issue of ML in Latvia, because 
the United States Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) accused the third biggest 
bank in the country – ABLV Bank – of the involvement in the ML activity, which led to the 
bank’s self-liquidation.4 It is not the first time when unlawful or suspicious banking practices of 
the Latvian banks drew the attention of the international community. The other two banks – 
Multibanka and VEF Banka – have also been listed for the special measures by FinCEN. It is 
worth mentioning that FinCEN list of sanctioned organisations contains in total 21 financial 
institutions, three of them of Latvian origin. Such a large number, in fact, is a warning signal for 
the national Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing (AML/CTF) legislation 
and enforcement, which proves that the research on the European AML/CTF legislation is of vital 
importance, taking into account the specifics of the national banking sector.5 
Despite the fact that money laundering is a widespread expression, it might be interpreted 
differently because of the lack of universally accepted definition of this phenomenon. Initially, 
money laundering referred to the money gained from the underground economy, including drug 
                                                
1 Annex 1. 
2 Rainer Hülsse, “Creating Demand for Global Governance: The Making of a Global Money-laundering Problem,” in 
Global Society, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2007), p. 155. Available at: 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13600820701201731. Last accessed: 3 May 2018.  
3 William R. Schroeder, “Money Laundering: A Global Threat and the International Community's Response,” FBI 
Law Enforcement Bulletin 70, No. 5 (May 2001), p. 1-9. Available at:  
http://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/fbileb70&i=142. Last accessed: 3 May 2018.  
4 On the Process of Voluntary Liquidation of ABLV Bank, ABLV Bank Official Website. Available at:  
https://www.ablv.com/en/legal-latest-news/voluntary-liquidation-of-ablv-bank-as-to-protect-the-interests-of-clients-
and-creditors/on-the-process-of-voluntary-liquidation-of-ablv-bank. Last accessed: 3 May 2018. 
5 Special Measures for Jurisdictions, Financial Institutions, or International Transactions of Primary Money 
Laundering Concern, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Official Website. Available at: 
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-and-regulations/311-special-measures. Last accessed: 3 May 2018. 
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dealing, smuggling, fraud, etc.6 Later, researchers included tax evasion and white collar crimes, 
such as invoice falsification and illegal capital flight.7 For the sake of simplicity, the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) suggested a straightforward definition, which states: “Money 
laundering is the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin.”8 However, 
money laundering does not relate to money only – the term encompasses virtually any property 
derived from the criminal activity.  
The property in this context shall mean  
assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or 
intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to or interests in such 
assets.9  
FATF played a key role in the creation of the modern AML/CTF policy. According to its 
mandate, organisation’s main task is identification and analysis of ML/TF and other threats to 
integrity of the systems, including research of the methods, schemes and trends involved. Its 
mission is to evaluate the impact of the methods against the abuse of the international financial 
system, supporting national, regional and global risk assessments.10  
There are three main FATF documents that are considered to have the most significance for the 
AML/CTF purposes. The first is the well-known FATF document – its 40 Recommendations. 
They set the framework for the comprehensive AML/CTF system, which has become the 
universally recognised standard.  
The second set of documents is the country reports: FATF performs country evaluations 
(including, but not limited to, review of legislation, enforcement mechanisms, FIU operation, 
etc.) to assess the condition of AML/CTF systems and their compliance with FATF 
Recommendations with an aim of preventing misuse of the financial system.11  
Lastly, FATF annually issues the list of the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT). 
The list contains the countries which are considered to have a detrimental effect in the fight 
against money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF).12  
                                                
6 Brigitte Unger, “The Gravity Model for Measuring Money Laundering and Tax Evasion,” Workshop on 
Macroeconomic and Policy Implication of Underground Economy and Tax Evasion (2009), p. 78-79. 
7 Friedrich Schneider and Dominik H. Enste, “Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences,” Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVIII (March 2000), p. 79. Available at:  
http://www.economics.uni-linz.ac.at/members/Schneider/files/publications/JEL.pdf. Last accessed: 3 May 2018. 
8 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), “The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Task 
Force on Money Laundering, With Interpretative notes,” International Legal Materials 35, No. 5 (1996), p. 1291. 
Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20698609. Last accessed: 3 May 2018. 
9 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, (Vienna, 1988), 
Article 1D. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf. Last accessed: 3 May 2018. 
10 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Financial Action Task Force Mandate 2012-2020, (Washington DC, 
2012), p. 2. Available at: 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FINAL%20FATF%20MANDATE%202012-2020.pdf.  
Last accessed: 3 May 2018.  
11 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance With the FATF 
Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML/CTF Systems (February 2018), p. 8. Available at: 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013.pdf. 
Last accessed: 3 May 2018.  
12 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories 2006-
2007: Eighth NCCT Review (Paris, 2017), p. 3. Available at:  
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The mandate of FATF is not limited to the three aforementioned functions, yet, these are the 
main ones.13 As for the institution itself, initially, its founders were the G-7 countries. Today, the 
list of members contains 35 countries and two regional organisations: the European Commission 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council. In order to ensure the implementation and enforcement of the 
FATF policy worldwide, various FATF-style regional organisations have been established, such 
as the Eurasian Group (EAG) and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF).14 
It is worth pointing out that FATF is not the only organisation that tackled the ML problem. 
Initially, FATF based its Recommendations on the UN Vienna Convention Against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.15 In Strasbourg Convention on Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, the Council of Europe (CoE) 
continued criminalisation of ML.16 Since then, many other international governmental and non-
governmental organisations made efforts to fight ML, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) being just one among many.17  
Despite the significance of aforementioned organisations, FATF had the biggest impact on the 
European AML/CTF legislation.18 Hence, along researching the evolution of the European AML 
legislation, it is necessary to first address FATF Recommendations. After all, it is exactly FATF 
that proposed the rule-based approach and later abandoned it in favour of the risk-based 
approach, thus setting the guidelines for the European Union. As various authors note, 
researching legislation on AML/CTF is never complete without the historical background to it.19 
This Thesis has its primary focus on the risk-based approach as enshrined in the Third and Fourth 
European AML Directives. It aims to answer three research questions. First, why did the 
European AML regime shift from the rule-based to the risk-based approach? Second, which 
benefits and implications does the risk-based approach bring? Third, how does the transition to 
the risk-based approach affect customer identification?  
Despite the fact that this Thesis discusses particular legal instruments, namely, the European 
AML Directives, a short historical background would be provided for each of them in order to 
trace the overall development of the field. 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2006%202007%20NCCT%20ENG.pdf. Last accessed: 3 May 
2018.  
13 Annex 2. 
14 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Official Website, FATF Members and Observers. Available at: 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/. Last accessed: 3 May 2018. 
15 UN Vienna Convention 1998, supra note 9, Article 3(b).  
16 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime 1990, 
Article 6. Available at: https://rm.coe.int/168007bd23. Last accessed: 3 May 2018.  
17 The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Money Laundering Awareness 
Handbook for Tax Examiners and Tax Auditors (2009), p.5. Available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/43841099.pdf. Last accessed: 3 May 2018. 
18 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Application of Directive 
2005/60/EC on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing, COM(2012) 168 final, (11.4.2012), p. 2. Available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/financial-crime/20120411_report_en.pdf. Last accessed: 3 May 
2018. 
19 Marcus Killick and David Parody, “Implementing AML/CFT measures that address the risks and not tick boxes,” 
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 15, Issue: 2 (2007), pp.210-216. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1108/13581980710744093 (permanent link) 
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The methodology used in this Thesis rests on the comparative model: thus, each subsequent 
Directive is being compared with its predecessor. Subsequently, to show the impact of the AML 
laws on the customer identification in general and specifically on risk evaluation, a detailed 
explanation of risk categories, as well as measures of risk assessment and mitigation, would be 
discussed. Apart from qualitative data, quantitative data would be used, such as statistics, cost-
benefit estimations and risk assessment models. 
The comparative nature of this paper suggests its aim – to explore the concept of the risk-based 
approach in the current AML legislation and identify its advantages as opposed to the alternative, 
i.e. rule-based approach. 
2. FOUNDATIONS OF ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING IN THE EU 
2.1. FATF Recommendations of 1990 as a basis for AMLD1 
The first reference to the question of the weak transaction reporting and the problem of money 
laundering by drug traffickers could be traced to European Parliament Resolution of October 
1986.20 Soon after, during the meetings of the Ministers, the Council proposed the Member States 
to consider mutual recognition as well as enhanced cooperation on freezing and confiscation of 
the drug traffickers’ assets.21 Next year, the European Community was engaged in the 
preliminary work on the Vienna Convention, which, among other things, covered the 
criminalisation of money laundering derived from drug-related offences.22  
In July 1989, the decision of the G-7 nations urged the international community to fight against 
drug trafficking and laundering of its proceeds, which marked the creation of the Financial 
Action Task Force.  
Less than in a year, the FATF 40 Recommendations were released to provide a general 
(emphasis added) guidance for the AML efforts to be universally applicable across both common 
and civil law systems. It equipped countries with a framework constructed to prevent, detect and 
punish money launderers.23 The Recommendations covered criminal justice system and law 
enforcement as well as focused on the role of the financial system, governmental regulations and 
international cooperation in combating ML.24 It was the first document of its kind, as it brought 
the overall framework to the unregulated field. Yet, it is important to note, that neither G-7 
Declarations nor FATF Recommendations are legally binding. 
                                                
20 The European Parliament, Resolution on the drug problem. Official Journal of the European Communities, Vol 29 
(10 November 1986), No C 283/79 - 81.  
21 The Commission of the European Communities Secretariat-General, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, Vol 29, No C 283/79-81 (10 November 1986), p.77 
22 Final Act of the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances 1988, p.1. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf.  
Last accessed: 3 May 2018. 
23 Navin Beekarry, “The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determinants in International Law,” Northwestern Journal 
of International Law & Business 31:137 (2011), p. 180. 
24 FATF Recommendation 1990, supra note 8, p.1293.  
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2.2. Background and scope 
Shortly after the release of the original FATF Recommendations, in June 1991, the European 
Community adopted the Council Directive on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for 
the Purpose of Money Laundering, also known as the First AML Directive. It was based on the 
above-mentioned FATF Recommendations, the 1988 UN Vienna Convention and the 1990 CoE 
Strasbourg Convention.25 The Directive covered regulatory gaps and became the first attempt of 
coordination in the field of ML on the EU level. Thus, it served as a basis to the comprehensive 
European AML legislation and introduced basic measures to prevent ML. Further, it urged the 
Member States to prohibit money laundering and sought to harmonise legislation in the field. 
As to the material scope, it covered prohibition of money laundering. In the Directive, money 
laundering was defined through another term – criminal activity, which mostly covered drug-
related offences.26 
As to the personal scope, the Directive was aimed to regulate financial and credit institutions as 
well as several professions involved in substantial cash transactions.27 
Thus, the Directive marked the beginning of ML supervision and monitoring of customers and 
their transactions. Most importantly for the purposes of this work, it brought the customer and 
beneficiary identification, but also bookkeeping procedures and suspicious transaction reporting 
system. However, there were some substantial shortcomings too.  
First, the competences of the European Community regarding judicial cooperation between the 
Member States in criminal matters have been established under the three-pillar system based on 
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which is a year after signing the Directive. Practically, before that the 
Directive could not regulate criminalisation issues and criminal matters that were under the 
Member States’ discretion. This led to confrontations and lengthy negotiations to convince the 
Member States to introduce criminal liability for offences outside the framework of the Directive. 
28 
Second, the Directive defined “criminal activity” as drug-related offences specified in Art. 3(1) of 
the Vienna Convention, and supplemented it with the wording “any other criminal activity 
designated as such for the purposes of this Directive by each Member State.”29 As the Greek 
professor of law Dr. Konstantinos D. Magliveras noticed:  
The definition of money laundering has been badly drafted because it leaves it to the 
discretion of Member States to decide which criminal activities should be designated. In 
effect, it allows for considerable disparities between national legislations.30 
                                                
25 Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of 
money laundering, Official Journal L 166. Recitals. Available at:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31991L0308. Last accessed: 3 May 2018.  
26 Ibid., Article 1 and Article 2.  
27 Ibid., Article 3. 
28 The Treaty on European Union 1992 (Maastricht Treaty), Article K.1. Available at: 
https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf. Last accessed: 3 
May 2018.  
29 Directive 91/308/EEC, supra note 25, Article 1. 
30 Konstantinos Magliveras, “The European Community’s Combat Against Money Laundering: Analysis and 
Evaluation,” Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol 5:93 (1998), p.99. 
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It did not specify other criminal offences to be covered and, as the content of the criminal codes 
differs among MS, the implementation was not unified.31 As a result, this contributed to the 
creation of the so-called “safe” jurisdictions like Luxembourg or Portugal, where the least of 
activities were penalised.32 Broad definitions of criminal activity and wide coverage of Article 
1(c) brought ambiguity for which AMLD1 was criticized.  
To the similar conclusion came Emma Radmore, Gautam Bhattacharyya and Miles Laddie. On 
the example of the UK, they argue that it would be complicated to determine whether activities 
carried out outside the country would constitute a criminal offence in the country (that is, the 
UK), especially if the activity is legal in other jurisdictions.33 
One more criticism was that it should have contained a non-exhaustive list of predicate offences 
(with the possibility for the Member States to extend the list), which would reduce disparities 
between the domestic legislations. Alternatively, the creation of an exhaustive list might have 
been complicated by different approaches taken by the Member States with regard to crimes. 34 
Another disadvantage concerns the personal scope of the Directive: it was addressed to defined 
financial and credit institutions, which left unclear the status of non-financial undertakings. In 
other words, casinos, dealers in objects of high value and legal professionals carrying out 
financial activities were not explicitly covered by the scope, which eventually allowed criminals 
to explore new schemes, falling outside the financial sector. 
2.3. Customer identification 
According to Article 3 of AMLD1, financial institutions and insurance companies shall perform 
customer identification and/or identification of the beneficiary when entering into business 
relations and whenever single or allegedly related transaction threshold of 15 000 EUR was 
reached and when transactions might be subjectively identified as suspicious.35  
Although the provision demanded identification of beneficiary (in case when the latter is 
presumed to be unknown) to be carried out, there were no procedures or definitions provided in 
the document, which resulted in heterogeneous implementation36. However, a positive 
                                                
31 The Commission of the European Communities, First Commission's Report on the Implementation of the Money 
Laundering Directive (91/308/EEC) to Be Submitted to the European Parliament and to the Council, COM(95) 54 
Final, (03.03.1995), p.7. Available at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:51995DC0054&qid=1525370717951&from=EN. 
Last accessed: 3 May 2018.  
32 Ibid., Annex III.  
33 Andrew Campbell, “The High-Street Solicitor and the Proceeds of Criminal Activity — The Risks”, Journal of 
Money Laundering Control, Vol. 1 Issue: 1 (1997), p. 8. Permanent link: https://doi.org/10.1108/eb027115 
34 Johanna Peurala. “The European Union’s Anti-Money Laundering Crusade – a Critical Analysis of the Responses 
by the EU/EC to Money Laundering,” Reports of the Police College of Finland 83/2009 (2009), p. 55. Available at: 
https://www.theseus.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/86709/Raportteja_83.pdf?sequence=1. Last accessed: 3 May 2018. 
35 Directive 91/308/EEC, supra note 25, Article 3. 
36 Commission of the European Communities, Second Commission Report to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the Implementation of the Money Laundering Directive Brussels, COM(1998) 401 final, (01.07.1998), p. 
12. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:51998DC0401&from=EN. Last 
accessed: 3 May 2018. 
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consequence was that banks and financial institutions refrained from opening anonymous bank 
accounts and/or from conducting transactions when the beneficiary’s identity was not known.37  
Another provision that raised issues was Art. 3(8), which allowed not to perform identification in 
case of insurance operations when a customer has already been identified.38 The Commission 
then proposed to extend this exemption to all financial transactions (except for opening of the 
bank accounts), which was rejected. On the one hand, such solution could be efficient and could 
potentially reduce the costs. On the other hand, however, customer risk assessment might have 
been jeopardized because of weak control over electronic and telephone banking. In any event, 
because of the emergence of new technologies, AMLD1 weakly regulated direct banking.39 
Nowadays, prevention of a crime is regarded as important as its repression. In this connection, 
the Chinese criminal law professor and researcher of the European AML/CTF policy He Ping 
concluded that the First AML Directive lacked effective methods of prevention of ML crimes. It 
was insufficiently developed to serve as a comprehensive preventive mechanism given the 
challenges of the money laundering schemes.40 
In general, the Directive imposed rules to be followed by the MS, which later would become 
known as the rule-based approach. The attempt of harmonisation of the AML legislation 
established cooperation between the Member States, whereas the exchange of information among 
related authorities paved the way for the further development. Yet, this was only the beginning: 
FATF Recommendations were revised in 1996 to extend the list of predicate offences and include 
not only the drug-related offences but also other serious crimes. However, not all scholars have 
welcomed the extension of the definition of ML. British professor of international banking and 
finance law Andrew Campbell described the situation as follows:  
If almost all forms of criminal activity of an economic nature are now covered this is a 
significant shift which … is very disturbing. The Law Society was certainly of the opinion 
that the provisions should relate to drug trafficking offences only and there was no 
requirement in the Money Laundering Directive that the law should be extended to cover 
virtually all crimes.41 
The extension as such was not revolutionary, as it has already been seen in the 1990 Strasbourg 
Convention, but it has set the tone for combating ML beyond the European Continent.42 Based on 
the revised Recommendations in general and specifically on Recommendation 9 and its annex,43 
the Commission stressed the need to extend and clarify the scope of the Directive as a major 
shortcoming of the First Directive.44  
  
                                                
37 Konstantinos Magliveras, “The European Community’s Combat Against Money”, supra note 30, p.102. 
38 Directive 91/308/EEC, supra note 25, Article 3.  
39 First Commission's Report on the Implementation of the Money Laundering Directive, supra note 31, p.11.  
40 He Ping, “The new weapon for combating money laundering in the EU”, Journal of Money Laundering Control, 
Vol. 8 Issue: 2 (2005), p. 119. Permanent Link: https://doi.org/10.1108/13685200510621163 
41 Andrew Campbell, “The High Street”, supra note 33  
42 FATF Recommendation 1990, supra note 8, p.1291. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20698609. Last 
accessed: 3 May 2018.  
43 Ibid., Recommendation 9 and Annex I.  
44 Second Report on the Implementation of the Money Laundering Directive, supra note 36, p. 11. 
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3. EVEN STRONGER RULE-BASED APPROACH 
3.1. FATF Special Recommendations of 2001 as a basis for AMLD2 
In 2001, FATF released Eight Special Recommendations and introduced the first Counter-
Terrorist Financing (CTF) standard.45 Its First Recommendation stressed the need to sign and 
ratify the UN Conventions against Terrorist Financing, while other described efficient tools to 
fight this issue and, not surprisingly, extended the list of ML predicate offences.46 
The scope of Recommendations was not limited to the financial sector, it has been extended to 
agents and legal entities involved in any type of money or value transferring. Furthermore, non-
profit organisations (NPOs) were enlisted to the document, as most countries did not regulate 
them correctly, which resulted in the exploitation of the structure.47  
The European Union reacted to the changes in international policy on AML/CTF by immediate 
action: one month later, the Directive 2001/97/EC, known as the Second AML Directive has been 
introduced.  
3.2. Aims and amendments to scope 
Not only the events of 9/11 caused the European legislature to consider amendments to the 
Directive, but also the advancement of the schemes used by launderers. The European Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union characterised the situation as follows:  
there is evidence that the tightening of controls in the financial sector has prompted 
money launderers to seek alternative methods for concealing the origin of the proceeds of 
crime.48  
FATF came to the same conclusion in its 2002-2003 report on ML typologies, where 24 
examples of cunning schemes of ML/TF were presented. It has been investigated that methods to 
disguise the true nature of the funds have developed and might exploit unprotected areas, e.g., 
NPOs, export/import companies, use of informal financial systems, etc.49  
The main goal of the new document against ML was to adopt measures which shall protect the 
integrity and stability of the European financial system as well as close the known loopholes.50 
                                                
45 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Annual Report 2001-2002 (2002), p. 5. Available at:  
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/fatfannualreport2001-2002.html. Last accessed: 3 may 2018.  
46 Ibid., Annex A. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2001 amending Council 
Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, OJ L 
344, 28.12.2001. Recital 13. Available at:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32001L0097&from=EN. Last accessed: 4 May 
2018. 
49 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2002-2003 (14 February 
2003), p. 1. Available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/moneylaunderingtypologies2002-
2003.html. Last accessed: 4 May 2018. 
50 Directive 2001/97/EC, Recital 2 and Recital 5. Available at:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32005L0060&from=EN. Last accessed: 4 May 
2018. 
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The Second Directive was not an independent document: instead, it presented the list of 
improvements and amendments to the First Directive.  
First, the Second Directive amended the material scope by extending the notion of the criminal 
activity. The list went beyond drug-related offences and, apart from offences defined in Article 
3(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention, included “the activities of criminal organisations as defined in 
Article 1 of Joint Action 98/733/JHA(12)”51, serious fraud “as defined in Article 1(1) and Article 
2 of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests”52 and 
corruption.  
The personal scope has been expanded to cover legal and natural persons of certain professions, 
which, due to the nature of their activities, were linked to substantial amounts of money. Thus, 
Article 2(a) included casinos, bureaux de change, auctioneers, auditors and lawyers, which are 
referred to as Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPS). To reinforce 
compliance among dealers in high-value goods, they were obliged to check customers in cases 
when the transaction reached the threshold of 15000 EUR in cash.  
An obvious disadvantage of Article 2(a)(6) is best illustrated with the following example: had a 
person bought a piece of art for 15000 EUR in cash, the auctioneer would have to pass him 
through AML checks; yet, had a person bought the same piece of art for the same amount of 
15000 EUR, but using credit card issued by some bank in Myanmar, the Directive would not be 
applicable.53 Likewise, if a person would regularly buy jewellery for 14000 EUR every week in 
the same shop, irrespective of whether in cash or using the credit card, it would remain unclear – 
based on the wording of the Directive – whether the jeweller54 would have to pass a person 
through identification checks.55  
The inclusion of lawyers in the personal scope brought some difficulties, as the Directive insisted 
on lifting professional secrecy in case the when a lawyer knew of his client’s ML activities.56 
Although the Directive generally prescribed legal professionals to report suspicious transactions, 
Article 6(3) allowed derogations. As it was pointed out in the Directive itself,  
                                                
51 98/733/JHA: Joint action of 21 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation in the Member States of the 
European Union, Official Journal L 351, 29.12.1998. Article 1. Available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:31998F0733&from=EN. Last accessed: 6 May 
2018.  
52 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection of the 
European Communities' financial interests, OJ C 316/49, 27.11.1995. Article 1(1) and Article 2. Available at:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:41995A1127(03)&from=EN. Last accessed: 6 
May 2018.  
53 Myanmar was referred as non-cooperative jurisdiction. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Review to 
Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories: Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti-Money 
Laundering Measures. Second NCCTs review (06/2001). p.3. 
Available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2000%202001%20NCCT%20ENG.pdf. Last 
accessed: 7 May 2018.  
54 In this fictional scenario, it is assumed that jeweller does not recognize the potential AML risk and his action is 
mocked up only according to the Second Directive.  
55 R.C.H. Alexander, Insider Dealing and Money Laundering in the EU: Law and Regulation. (London, Routledge: 
2007). p.153. 
56 Directive 2001/97/EC, supra note 48, Recital 2. 
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It would not be appropriate ... to put these legal professionals in respect of these activities 
under an obligation to report suspicions of money laundering.57 
 The controversy around this legal norm caused several claims being filed to the European Court 
of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights to review compliance of the Directive’s 
provisions with Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights58, i.e. the right to 
fair trial and the right to respect for private life respectively.59  
Article 3(11) brought a major advance towards the Know Your Customer (KYC) rule: it imposed 
stricter rules on non-face-to-face operations by requiring the customers to submit additional 
documentation to ensure their identification, such as an electronic signature.60 This is a large step 
forward in comparison with the previous legislation, where operations via phone or email were 
not clearly covered.61  
In addition, one of the most crucial changes was Article 10. It introduced domestic supervisory 
body over stock exchange, foreign exchange and financial market.62 The aim of the body was to 
monitor national transactions and report to the relevant authorities in case of suspicion of ML. It 
was the first time when such bodies, which would later become known as Financial Intelligence 
Units (FIUs), were introduced. This is an important rule, as the FIUs are not just autonomous 
supervisory bodies but most often part of the whole national judicial system63, as they may need 
the access to administrative, enforcement or financial information.64  
4. FIRST AND SECOND AMLD: THE ESSENCE OF THE RULE-BASED 
APPROACH 
To conclude on the First and Second AML Directives, the principles and methods they contain 
marked a creation of a united and coherent system against ML and TF. It has been seen that both 
Directives provided a system of rules aimed to detect and prevent misuse of the financial system 
composed of methods and techniques based on the assumptions.  
In essence, the rule-based approach is based on one main assumption: that the field of ML is 
homogeneous, therefore, predetermined regulations would substantially cover potential risks. 
                                                
57 Ibid., Recital 17. 
58 Sara De Vido, “Anti-Money Laundering Measures Versus European Union Fundamental Freedoms and Human 
Rights in the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice,” 
German Law Journal Vol. 16 No. 05 (2005), p. 1281.  
Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2848202. Last accessed: 7 May 2018.  
59 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 
14 supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13. Article 6 and 8. Available at:  
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. Last accessed: 16 March 2018. 
60 Directive 2001/97/EC, supra note 48, Article 3(11). 
61 Jane Welch, Javier Munoz del Guayo and others, “Comparative Implementation of EU Directives (II) – Money 
Laundering,” The British Institute of International and Comparative Law (December 2006), p.11. 
62 Directive 2001/97/EC, supra note 48, Article 10. 
63 For example, the FIU in Latvia is Office for Prevention of Laundering of Proceeds Derived from Criminal 
Activity, which is a department under the prosecutor office. 
64 Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview. International Monetary Fund World Bank (2004), p.111. Available at: 
 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/FIU/fiu.pdf. Last accessed: 7 May 2018. 
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Such approach implies an obligation of the covered persons and institutions to follow the rules, 
precluding additional initiative to manage the risk on their part.  
Paolo Costanzo, the head of Italian FIU, has highlighted that the rule-based approach has at least 
two apparent benefits: first, it was simpler and, second, less costly to implement and follow the 
AML norms, since the rules and requirements were created in advance and did not vary 
depending on the situation.65 It could also be argued that the rule-based approach required fewer 
efforts from the regulator, as threats and vulnerabilities were taken into consideration neither in 
the laws nor by the supervisory bodies. Conversely, the risk-based approach, which will be 
discussed in the chapters to follow, requires a shared understanding of risks between the financial 
institutions and the regulator, as well as some common view on financial institutions’ obligations 
under each specific risk category. 
It is argued, however, that deficiencies of such approach outweigh the benefits, not just in 
number but also in substance. 
First, it was noted by the UK Financial Services Authority, the rule-based approach might be 
inefficient due to disproportionate measures and the “one size fits all” attitude.66 The AML policy 
under the rule-based approach could have been easily manipulated by the launderers, as it is well 
illustrated by the jeweller example.  
Second, the threshold system of suspicious transaction reporting fails to cover the instances when 
transactions are reaching just below the threshold. Such formalistic approach is not appropriate as 
it fails to attain the ultimate purpose of AML, that is, combating misuse of the financial system.  
Third – and the most important – negative consequence logically follows from the previous one: 
the rule-based approach, in fact, allows financial institutions and risk managers to do just enough 
to be formally in compliance with the rules, which is known as the “tick-box approach”.67 Thus, 
such approach has a somewhat “relaxing” effect on both the subjects and the agents, that is, on 
both the potential perpetrators and the supervisory bodies. 
Additionally, besides the law itself, it is important to consider its implementation. European 
AML/CTF scholar Anna Simonova points out that the main problem of the Directives operated 
under the rule-based approach was the lack of enforcement tools: 
No enforcement instruments were demanded and it seems that, like under the First 
Directive, enforcement was not truly a point of attention in the Second Directive.68 
                                                
65 Paolo Costanzo, “The risk-based approach to anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing in 
international and EU standards: what it is, what it entails”. Research Handbook on Money Laundering, (Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), p.1. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4337/9780857934000.00038  
66 Abdullahi Bello and Jackie Harvey. “From a risk-based to an uncertainty-based approach to anti-money laundering 
compliance,” Security Journal, 30(1) (2017), pp. 24-38. Available at:  
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/26933/3/Harvey_Uncertainty%20based%20approach%20to%20AML%20submitted%20
to%20Security%20journal.pdf. Last accessed: 7 May 2018. 
67 Marcus Killick, “Implementing AML/CFT measures” that address the risks and not tick boxes”, supra note 19, p. 
215. 
68 Anna Simonova, “The risk-based approach to anti-money laundering: problems and solutions,” Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, Vol. 14 Issue: 4 (2011), p. 177. Permanent link to this document: 
https://doi.org/10.1108/13685201111173820 
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It is important to note, however, that the ruled-based and the risk-based approach are in no way 
mutually exclusive and, actually, are not completely contrary to each other. It is possible that 
certain elements of the former are present in the latter. As it will be discussed further, a relatively 
cheap and clear guidance proposed under the rule-based approach system supported the inception 
of the risk-based approach. As the creation of the latter required resources and time, the rule-
based approach had a certain compensatory role until it fully crystallised.  
Eventually, the rule-based approach became unsuitable to the new realities of financial market: 
the means of ML have evolved, which resulted in the decrease of the AML policy efficiency. 
Such developments required risk differentiation as well as more flexibility from financial 
institutions for AML laws to face new challenges, which consequently led to a creation of an 
entirely new system of risk evaluation. 
5. INCEPTION OF THE RISK-BASED APPROACH 
5.1. FATF Recommendations of 2003 as a basis for AMLD3 
In 2003, a new milestone in the development of the European AML/CTF was brought by the 
second revision of the FATF Forty Recommendations, which was applicable not only to ML 
issues, but also to TF supported by Eight Special Recommendations aimed to provide an 
“enhanced, comprehensive and consistent framework of measures” to combat the mentioned 
problems.69 Based on the 1988 UN Vienna and the 1990 Palermo Conventions, Recommendation 
1 was amended so as to cover the widest range of predicate offences, encompassing numerous 
serious crimes beyond drug-related crimes.  
Apart from the Recommendation itself, a pool of designated categories of offences was attached 
to avoid misinterpretation and provide a general guideline for each country to decide how it 
would translate definitions and principles to the national level.70 
The amendments introduced a more profound and complex system of risk evaluation as well as 
provided guidelines on effective KYC principles.71 The issue of due diligence (DD) rapidly 
became crucial for the functionality of the AML policy. Researcher and Chief Legal Advisor of 
the Bank of Portugal, Inês Sofia de Oliveira, referred to the due diligence as a recognized core 
and the most relevant element of AML.72  
The reason behind the importance of the due diligence lies in need of the financial system to be 
informed as much as possible about the customers and their activity. FATF Recommendations 
are addressing the issue of information gathering, not control over financial institutions or 
sanctions to perpetrators, which is a fundamental feature of the modern risk-based approach. 
                                                
69 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), The FATF Recommendations 2003 (October 2004), p.2. Available at:  
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FATF%20Standards%20-%2040%20Recommendations%20rc.pdf. 
Last accessed: 7 May 2018. 
70 Ibid., p.15 
71 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document Customer due diligence for banks (January 
2001), p.3. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs77.pdf. Last accessed: 7 May 2018. 
72 Inês Sofia de Oliveira, “Anti-Money Laundering: the conditions for global governance and harmonisation,” The 
University of Edinburgh (2014), p.18. Available at: https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/15922?show=full. Last 
accessed: 7 May 2018.  
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Likewise, the authors of the World Bank study materials on AML underlined the nature of the 
new system against previous entire rules controlled approach:  
information, rather than control of the transactions, is the key to the basic “know your 
customer” approach of the FATF. More generally, the value of adequate information to 
guide the supervision of modern financial markets—in which there is a good measure of 
transparency and prudential regulation to ensure the fairness, soundness, and legality of 
the systems. 73 
However, as Australian AML/CTF researcher Jackie Johnson pointed out, the FATF 
Recommendations 2003 failed to provide adequate control over the gambling sector. She argues 
that the customer due diligence and reporting system proposed by the FATF are oriented towards 
the banking sector, leaving aside non-financial businesses. Therefore, not only the appropriate 
procedure of customer due diligence, but rather the tailor-made regulation is necessary to cover 
each ML-exposed sector.74 
Last among major innovations, Recommendation 18 introduced a non-cooperation clause with 
the shell banks that are incorporated in non-regulated jurisdictions and are not legally affiliated 
with financial institutions. Although such banks are used as secrecy havens, which is mostly seen 
as having a detrimental effect, these jurisdictions are not necessarily being used by the criminals, 
so a total ban on dealing with them would be a disproportionate solution.75 
5.2. Background and scope 
In 2005, contrary to a conventional approach (that is, to wait for the Commission's report on the 
implementation of the Directive in force), the Council and the European Parliament released a 
new Directive. According to Mariano Fernandez Salas, the plausible reason to hurry was the 
release of the revised FATF Recommendations of 2003 coupled with the willingness to reconcile 
definitions of the serious crimes with the Justice and Home Affairs Council framework.76 
FATF brought a new concept for AML/CTF policy: the so-called risk-based approach (RBA), 
which envisaged a distribution of resources according to the potential customers’ risk based on 
risk evaluation. While both previous Directives adopted a reactive approach, i.e. detecting the 
misuse after the actual crime has already been committed, the new AML/CTF policy included in 
the Third Directive offered a completely different – proactive – approach, focusing on preventing 
the flows of “dirty money” in the economy.  
                                                
73 The World Bank, Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism: A Comprehensive Training 
Guide, Volume 1 (2009), p.19. Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/CombattingMLandTF.pdf. Last accessed: 7 
May 2018.  
74  Jackie Johnson, “An analysis of the obligations of gambling entities under the FATF's 2003 anti- 
money laundering recommendations”, Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 9 Issue: 1 (2006), p.12. 
Permanent link to this document: https://doi.org/10.1108/13685200610645184 
75 The FATF Recommendation 2003, supra note 69, Recommendation 18. 
76 Mariano Fernández Salas, “The third anti-money laundering directive and the legal profession,” European 
Association of Lawyers (October 2005), p.2. Available at:  
https://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=7B528765-CB1F-4748-9733-
68935E2C4745. Last accessed: 7 May 2018.  
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Another reason for having the new Directive was the Community’s realisation that the 
implementation of previous Directives was neither unified nor substantially effective, as each 
Member State tried to protect its own financial system. Thus, a more coordinated and profound 
inference of the European institutions was required.77 
As to the material scope of the Directive, due to globalisation and overall technological 
advancement, the definition of property was extended to also cover electronic and digital assets, 
including electronic money. Extension of the definition allowed to cover e-money, as it 
represented a new, yet unexplored territory with even faster transactions, making ML a 
considerably more problematic area.78 The issue of electronic money still remains topical and, 
within the scope of AMLD, is seen as failing to prevent cyber laundering. It is submitted by the 
author of this Thesis, however, that the inclusion of internet transactions was not a successful 
decision, as a separate framework is required to the fight cyber laundering phenomenon 
effectively.  
The personal scope of the Third Directive was once again extended and encompassed any natural 
or legal persons trading in goods, which accept single or several transactions beyond 15000 EUR 
in cash.79 This provision might be beneficial for some business sectors, but the problem of cash-
credit cards and frequent purchases remained unanswered. The controversy still exists around the 
reasoning as to why the credit cards, which potentially could be used for ML purposes, fall out of 
the identification procedure (as opposed to in-cash operations).  
Further, trusts and company service providers have also been included to the scope of the 
Directive. The aim was to restrict evasion from AML rules and establish control over essentially 
every institution engaged in a large number of transactions. Trusts and company service 
providers have been severely used by the criminals: their nature is similar to other financial 
related professions (e.g., advisors or lawyers) but they were out of the scope under the previous 
Directives. Thus, the idea behind the extension of the scope was to cover the previously 
uncovered entities. FATF came to the same outcomes in its report “The Misuse of Corporate 
Vehicles”, where one of the major concerns was the lack of the regulation on trusts and company 
service providers, as those could have been easily established and easily liquidated due to 
legislative loopholes in certain jurisdictions.80  
Lastly, Article 5 of the new Directive stated that the Member States may decide to adopt or retain 
in force stricter rules in the field covered by the Directive. Hence, the Directive foresaw the 
                                                
77 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the Prevention of the 
Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, OJ L 309/15, 
25.11.2005, Recital 2. Available at:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32005L0060&from=EN. Last accessed: 7 May 
2018.  
78 Ibid., Article 3(3). 
79 Ibid., Article 2(3)(e). 
80 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), The Misuse of Corporate Vehicles, Including Trust and Company 
Service Providers (13 October 2006), p. 1-2. Available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ 
Misuse%20of%20Corporate%20Vehicles%20including%20Trusts%20and%20Company%20Services%20Providers.
pdf. Last accessed: 7 May 2018. 
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possibility of different AML regimes among the MS. In other words, only minimum 
harmonisation requirements have been imposed.81 
5.3. Risk-based approach to customer due diligence 
According to the FATF Recommendations82, the risk of ML/TF among customers and their 
transactions may vary and it is a duty of every entity covered by the scope of the Directive to 
evaluate such risk. It guarantees flexibility and provides measures according to the risk-sensitive 
differentiation, which distinguishes three major categories of risk: simplified, regular and 
enhanced customer due diligence (CDD), ordered accordingly by the level of posed risk.  
Article 8(2) clearly explains the impact of the risk-based approach on the customer due diligence: 
The institutions and persons covered by this [Third] Directive shall apply each of the 
customer due diligence … but may determine the extent of such measures on a risk-
sensitive basis depending on the type of customer, business relationship, product or 
transaction.83 
The choice of the relevant due diligence procedure is not dictated but partially predetermined, 
which may be viewed as a legacy of the rule-based approach. The goal of the risk-based approach 
system is to recognise risks and ensure appropriate monitoring of the customers’ activity. The 
approach, however, is not harmonised across the EU, as the Member States may shape their own 
systems and decide on the necessary techniques to be used by financial institutions.84  
According to Article 7, the regular customer due diligence procedure shall be performed under 
certain circumstances: a) before establishing business relationships; b) when occasional single or 
several transactions which appeared to be linked reach the limit of EUR 15000; c) where there is 
suspicion of ML/TF (a rather traditional clause for AML policies); d) where information on 
customers/transactions, which was collected prior, is subject to doubts.85 
The rule obliging to perform CDD before establishing business relationships brought some 
challenges. It was seen as complicated with regard to timing issues, so it was proposed to extend 
the period of fulfilment of CDD and allow performing it after the relationships have started, 
which, regrettably, was not upheld. 
Furthermore, general obligations of customer due diligence under AMLD3 might be roughly 
divided into three stages: first, obtaining information confirming legal existence of the entity, 
name, address, structure of the company, directors, power to bind; second, the identification of 
                                                
81 Deloitte, European Commission DG Internal Market and Services - Budget Final Study on the Application of the 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive (2010), p.26. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/financial-crime/20110124_study_amld_en.pdf. Last accessed: 7 
May 2018.  
82 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Application of Directive 
2005/60/EC on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing, 52012DC0168, Point 2.1. Available at:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0168&from=EN. Last accessed: 7 
May 2018.  
83 Directive 2005/60/EC, supra note 77, Article 8(2).  
84 Report from the Commission, supra note 82, Point 2.1.  
85 Directive 2005/60/EC, supra note 77, Article 7. 
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the beneficial ownership; third, supplementary information on the purposes and the nature of the 
business relationships or a transaction.86 
The collection of information is the cornerstone of the risk-based approach. Finding an 
independent and reliable source of information was regarded as the cornerstone of the 
identification process, which would allow assessing the risk properly. Moreover, it is 
accompanied by the ongoing monitoring, i.e. constant verification of the person. It is done in 
order to confirm, update and evaluate the information collected against ML/TF risks. As a 
consequence, all information gathered on the customer allows the institutions to divide all 
customer into groups on the risk-sensitive basis.87 
Unsurprisingly, customer due diligence under AMLD3 does not stop when transactions or initial 
due diligence was executed. Instead, the information and records collected during the previous 
stages shall be stored for five years after the termination of the relationships with a client.88 This 
is required in order to be able to provide necessary information to FIU or other institutions, which 
may need such information for investigation purposes or for statistical needs as a part of ML/TF 
research.89 
Principles laid down in the customer due diligence constitute a dual system used in AMLD3. 
First, the AML policy became risk-sensitive during the customer identification stage. Second, 
monitoring and storage of information ensure that data is complete and ready to be used as a 
reference. Consequently, the financial system has begun to exercise surveillance functions, as 
data collection and monitoring capacities were brought on a new level. 
As for implications, the research made by the European Commission has shown that stakeholders 
experienced some issues concerning the implementation of the risk-based approach to the CDD. 
Most financial institutions have put the IT compliance systems into action, which are able to 
perform automated customers risk analysis. These systems, however, may require significant 
development and implementation costs, but the alternative of manually carrying out the customer 
analysis does not seem less costly or more adequate.90  
Additionally, as the scope of the Directive was extended to cover non-financial institutions, they 
were also required to fulfil all AML requirements. Yet, in contrast to the financial sector, 
guidance provided for non-financial institutions was not sufficiently detailed with regard to the 
practical aspects of the risk-based approach. This is also complicated by the fact that the 
instructions provided by competent authorities were not always publicly available.  
Likewise, non-financial professions also experienced lack of guidance. Reference to FATF91 
rules was considered insufficient, and stakeholders urged the need to have the rules adapted to 
their domestic situation.92 
                                                
86 Ibid., Article 8.  
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid., Article 30. 
89 Ibid., Article 33.  
90 Deloitte Study, supra note 81, p. 295.  
91 Such as FATF Guidance for Legal Professionals, FATF Guidance for Real Estate Agents, FATF Guidance for 
External Accountants, and FATF Guidance for Trust and Company Service Providers.  
92 Deloitte Study, supra note 81, p. 48. 
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5.4. Risk-sensitive categorisation 
Simplified due diligence (SDD) procedure is applicable to the low-risk persons and entities. 
Practically, SDD means the absence of due diligence at all, because of the minimum level of risk 
posed by such customers.93 According to Article 11, such instances are publicly traded companies 
(because of mandatory disclosure obligations that guarantees transparency), governmental 
institutions, pensions and insurance services under certain threshold, confirmed accounts of 
notaries and other independent legal professions, where customer due diligence procedure was 
already performed by financial institutions with recognised and efficient AML policy.94 
Additionally, Article 11 introduced the so-called third-party equivalence principle, also known as 
the “white list”.95 The idea was to indicate those jurisdictions where AML/CTF policy was 
equivalent to the EU in order to pass customers from those countries through lighter CDD 
checks. The jurisdictions of the “white list” are chosen and agreed by the MS, which makes the 
list acceptable and harmonised across the EU.96 Worth noting, the idea of having such “white 
list” existed only in the Third AML Directive and was abolished already in the Fourth. 
In comparison with AMLD3, FATF recommended granting exemption from the regular CDD not 
only to the legal professionals but to all DNFBPs that were effectively controlled as to their 
compliance with AML policy, as well as specific products and services, where it was least likely 
to be used in illicit purposes97. This constitutes a demonstrative example of the EU’s thorough 
and serious approach towards ML/CTF. 
Notably, the covered persons and entities were reluctant to apply the SDD procedure but 
preferred to pass all their customers through the regular CDD. The justification was based on the 
entities’ anxiety that competent authorities could question the entities' activities in case when the 
suspicious transaction reporting was missing. It is seen that application of SDD could add a level 
of complexity to the due diligence procedure, as entities would have to double check if a 
customer is truly eligible for SDD without negative consequences.98 
Alternatively, the Directive envisaged enhanced due diligence (EDD) for high-risk customers, 
which, put simply, is additional attention from the financial institutions. The measures to monitor 
and reduce the risks include a closer review prior opening of an account and processing of the 
transaction along with more frequent ongoing checks.  
Provision of services to high-risk groups is traditionally expensive and requires from financial 
institutions, in particular from private banks, additional measures to be taken. Exactly for these 
purposes, the Wolfsberg group has been created due to consideration that private banks were not 
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sufficiently involved in the fight against ML.99 However, the discussion of the Wolfsberg Group 
falls outside the scope of this Thesis, as it is mostly known for the development of the KYC and 
AML/CFT policies designed to be part of risk management strategy of financial institutions. 
The high-risk status of customers does not as such mean that these customers are criminals, 
because otherwise, for obvious reasons, provision of services to them would have been 
prohibited. To compensate risk, increased scrutiny and vigilant control over high-risk profiles is 
probably the only solution to keep them in the financial system. Therefore, detailed instructions 
on the high-risk management are the only acceptable way to safeguard the financial system from 
misuse whilst letting high-risk customers open accounts and make transactions. 
As for the Directive, Article 13 specifies special occasions when financial institutions are obliged 
to pass the customer through an enhanced customer due diligence. The article explicitly covers 
three groups of high-risk profiles: when the customer is not present for identification, when the 
banking relationship with the corresponding account goes beyond the borders of the EU and in 
case of politically exposed persons (PEPs).100 
Unlike previous Directives, AMLD3 lists specific measures so as to atone each case of a high-
risk profile. For customers unavailable for physical identification, measures are focused on 
additional information gathering from reliable sources.101 
In order to maintain cross-frontier banking relationships, financial institutions shall collect 
sufficient information to understand the true nature of the respondent’s business and verify its 
reputation through publicly available sources. Further, it is required to confirm the AML/CTF 
policy of another financial institution and document obligations of each of them.102 
Interestingly, the Directive explicitly obliged the employees of financial institution to obtain 
approval from the senior management in order to continue such relationships. The author 
supposes that the background for such rule comes from the cases where the banks cooperated 
with money launderers, and the senior management denied responsibility during the criminal 
investigation, arguing that they never knew that illegal activity was taking place at their 
institution.103 
5.5. Politically exposed persons 
The last group of the high-risk customers provided in Article 13 is politically exposed persons 
(PEPs) from other Member States or the third countries. The introduction of PEPs not only 
played an important role in the formation of the modern European AML policy, but became the 
main aspect of the international AML strategy as a whole. Politically exposed persons were 
specifically tackled in the new FATF Recommendations and were rapidly translated into the 
European Union legislation. PEPs are defined as “individuals who are or have been entrusted 
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with prominent public functions [at a senior level in a foreign country]”104 as well as their family 
relatives and close associates.  
For example, PEPs are the Head of States, Members of high-level courts, Ambassadors and 
Members of Parliament. Generally, there are no difficulties regarding the primary definition of 
PEPs, but rather with relatives and close associates, as these groups are not clearly defined in the 
Directive and thus could be interpreted widely.  
Another problem is that commercial databases used by entities to perform due diligence might be 
incomplete for several reasons: e.g., commercial databases might not contain data on family 
members and close associates of the PEP, or there might be no publicly available information to 
verify the source.105 It is further unclear what should be the status of individuals who are no 
longer entrusted with prominent position, that is, whether they qualify or do not qualify as PEPs. 
Article 3(9) states that PEPs are “persons who are or have been entrusted with prominent public 
functions.”106 This might be interpreted in a way that, once an individual is classified as a PEP, 
there is no way he or she could change their status, even, say, 20 years after one has left the 
position. Such interpretation could easily become a heavy burden on the financial system, as it 
requires constant monitoring and database updates. Finally, due to rotation of politicians, the 
database which contains current and previous PEPs could become onerous to manage and 
guarantee the privacy of such data.  
The PEP status also requires additional measures to be taken in order to ensure that there is no 
exploitation of the senior position or involvement in bribery and corruption activities, which is a 
logical continuation of the scope extension. It implies that the financial institutions should have 
such a risk management system that detects PEPs and requires approval from the senior 
management prior the establishment of business relationships (the same approach as with cross-
frontier cooperation). Additional measures shall constitute verification of the funds’ source and 
ongoing due diligence.107 In general, the potential risk that PEPs bear and the influence of the 
politically exposed customers justify the alertness of the legislature.  
To conclude, the flexibility of due diligence is the main advantage of categorization of the 
customers, which allows to reduce the costs and reallocate the resources wisely, as there is no 
need to examine the customer which is already known to fall into the low-risk category. Instead, 
this allows doubling check those customers who might pose an actually serious risk. 
5.6. Beneficial ownership 
During the due diligence procedure, a beneficial owner shall be established. Although the concept 
of the beneficial ownership has been seen in the previous Directives108, it was not considered as 
important as with the risk-based approach. In this connection, Greek lawyer Pavlos Neofytou 
Kourtellos points out that the importance of the principle coupled with a big concern around 
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beneficial ownership creates a tendency to use legal owners as a façade and disguise the real 
beneficial entity.109 
The Third AML Directive introduced clear definitions and rules of identification. According to 
Article 3(6), a beneficial owner shall mean an exclusively natural person, who ultimately owns, 
controls and on whose behalf transactions are executed.110 Therefore, during the due diligence 
procedure, financial institutions shall perform the risk-based investigation to find not just the 
legal holder of the account, but its factual controller. The Article also specifies the indicators of a 
person who can be classified as beneficiary. In case of corporate entities, for instance, it is a 
person who ultimately holds the direct or indirect control over shareholding/controlling or 
ownership interest over 25% threshold.  
Alternatively, beneficial ownership of legal entities, including trusts and other legal arrangements 
which manage funds, is established through a more complicated procedure. The basic rule 
remains – a person who controls more than 25% of a property of the entity shall be considered as 
a beneficial owner. Additional provisions concern contracts where beneficiaries have already 
been predetermined. In the case when beneficiary individuals are not determined yet, a class of 
person in whose main interest a legal entity operates or was created in a first place shall be 
considered to be beneficial owners.111 
Those rules, however, do not preclude financial institutions from setting a lower threshold. They 
have the discretion to set their own information collection procedures on beneficiary within the 
framework of the Directive. In fact, Article 43 shows the willingness to lower the 25% threshold, 
which, however, was never implemented.112  
A logical continuation of the risk-based approach is that identification of the beneficial owner 
shall be established before the commencement of business relationships or at the time of the 
transaction. The risk-sensitive approach emphasises the need to understand the structure of the 
respondent entity and assess its the risk through the prism of critical analysis. By the same token, 
companies characterized by hidden natural persons and non-transparent transactions leading to 
Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories (NCCTs) shall be deemed as high-risk profiles, 
regardless of the success of identification.113 
Beneficial ownership was created as a purely AML notion and raised interpretive issues on 
national levels, as it was not the term commonly used in company law, civil law, etc. Even more, 
complexity was brought by the external nature of the beneficial ownership, such as gaining 
information on a foreign client and identification of a legal structure of a foreign company.114 
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Generally, one may conclude that beneficial ownership principle introduced by AMLD3 and 
FATF was applicable mostly to simple scenarios.115 The complex structures of the entities, 
however, highlighted its deficiencies, as means of the identification were to some extent effective 
regarding locally based companies and often impractical regarding the companies with numerous 
layers of intermediate entities located in several jurisdictions.116  
Thus, to conclude, the Third AML Directive became the breakthrough in the whole European 
AML policy, as it introduced an entirely new, unprecedented view at the AML in general and 
specifically at the customer identification with the due diligence procedures. However, as this 
was the first step in this new area, certain aspects appeared to be raw and required improvement, 
brought by the new FATF Recommendation and, subsequently, the Fourth AML Directive – 
discussed further below. 
6. ENHANCED RISK-BASED APPROACH 
6.1. FATF Recommendations of 2012 as a basis for AMLD4 
The financial world has changed, the means of money laundering and terrorist financing crimes 
have altered as well. FATF concluded that, in order to effectively fight illicit money flows 
globally, predefined laws are no longer sufficient to cover the variety of schemes and methods 
used by the money launderers.117 It was considered that constant evaluation, identification, 
apprehension and mitigation of ML/TF risks were the only solution to adopt effective measures 
against those risks.118 
Hence, the main change brought by the FATF Recommendation of 2012 was a greater emphasis 
on the risk-based approach. In other words, a mixed approach (composed of the elements of both 
approaches) of the AML/CTF rules under the previous FATF policy shifted to the pure risk-based 
approach. Traditionally, the European AML regulation successfully mirrored FATF 
Recommendations, which also in this case resulted in the accelerated adoption of the risk-based 
approach in the EU. Put differently, customer due diligence, transaction monitoring and many 
other measures lost their rigid forms in favour of the dynamic risk assessment.119 
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Recommendation 1 has clearly set the purpose of the new policy: 
This approach should be an essential foundation to efficient allocation of resources across 
the anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime 
and the implementation of risk-based measures throughout the FATF 
Recommendations.120 
Another issue that was tackled by FATF was beneficial ownership. The Recommendations 
suggested an information-oriented way to strengthen the measures against the lack of 
transparency and deficiencies of the previous regulation. It also imposed a minimum requirement 
on identity information (such as name, proof of incorporation, list of directors, etc.) and 
sanctioned a special register of shareholders and members of the legal entities.121 Special 
attention has been devoted to the storage of the customer information in order to ensure its 
accessibility to the competent authorities.  
6.2. Background and scope  
As to the material scope, the Directive was amended to encompass more predicate offences of 
ML/TF crimes.122 According to FATF, the notion of “criminal activity” has been enlarged to 
cover tax crimes as well. While it is a logical result of the creeping policy of the AML Directives, 
the efficiency of having the Directive with such an expansive scope might be questioned. 
Additionally, electronic and virtual money products have also been included in the scope. The 
introduction of electronic money products was mostly justified by its extensive popularity, 
especially among criminals and money launderers.123 Electronic money reduces transparency and 
is commonly anonymous. Moreover, monitoring capacities of the electronic money institutions 
are not coherent; hence, it might be impossible to evaluate customers and transactions according 
to AML/CTF standards.124 
As to the personal scope, the first thing one notices when reading the Directive is an elaborate 
Article 2 (scope and definitions). As it was seen in other European AML Directives, the scope of 
each next Directive keeps expanding to impose obligations on more entities. The Fourth 
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Directive is not an exception: the new group of entities has been added to the scope of AMLD4 
scope – providers of gambling services.125 
Previous AML regulations contained only casinos, but this time the EU went further and covered 
all types of services involving “wagering a stake with monetary value in games of chance.”126 
However, the Member States were granted discretion to provide partial or full exemptions to 
gambling providers on the basis of a proven low risk.127 
Historically, various gambling services were regarded as exposed to ML risks. Land-based 
betting and poker are vulnerable to ML due to lack of appropriate control. The key characteristic 
of such gambling activities is a substantial amount of fast and anonymous transactions in cash or 
on a peer-to-peer basis, which is – obviously – not regulated effectively. 
Online gambling is considered as a high-risk activity due to substantial non-face-to-face 
component and a large number of transactions. Not rarely online gambling platforms offer 
anonymous payment methods to ensure privacy of their customers, yet, from the AML 
perspective, this complicates the tracking of transactions.128 
6.3. Risk-based approach crystallised  
As already noted above, the Fourth Directive is characterized by the shift from the mixed (rule-
based and risk-based) to the enhanced risk-based approach, which assesses the risk on the 
multidimensional scale. In other words, the way of implementation of the risk-based approach 
has been altered. One may see that the development of the risk-based approach brought more 
flexibility for the AML policy, but it should be noted that, at the price of flexibility, it became 
more difficult for the entities to define what kind of specific measures organisations need to put 
in place in order to comply with the AML/CTF policy.129 
The key feature of the enhanced risk-based approach under AMLD4 is the following: institutions 
are obliged to identify, understand and mitigate their ML risks with no reference to the good old 
rulebook that has been available earlier. The rulebook served as a guidance, especially in cases of 
dilemma between simplified and enhanced due diligence procedure. Now, organisations shall 
choose suitable procedures and evaluate risks on their own. 
Additionally, all institutions are required to define their parameters of risk assessment, because 
they are now accountable for any decision made under their own risk-based evaluation. 
According to Recital 22 of the Directive, risk-based approach is not “an unduly permissive option 
for the Member States and obliged entities”130 but rather the evidence-based decision-making tool 
in order to fight AML/CTF risks.131 
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Another amendment brought by the Fourth Directive is the introduction of the National Risk 
Assessment. The goal of the innovation is to introduce a supranational body to monitor ML 
activity in the EU. The content of such reports is stated in Recital 21: 
In the risk assessment, Member States should indicate how they have taken into account 
any relevant findings in the reports issued by the Commission in the framework of the 
supranational risk assessment.132 
Moreover, according to Article 8, the Member States shall oblige covered entities not only to 
identify, assess and understand ML risks, but also to keep them updated and available to 
competent authorities. Article also specifies the factors that shall be taken into consideration 
during the risk assessment: customer, geographic areas, products, services, transaction and 
delivery channels.133 Such thorough risk assessment, as well as AML policy and controls, shall 
mitigate and manage AML/CTF risks.  
Eventually, collected information is processed by the European Commission and published in the 
form of the Supranational Risk Assessment Report, which is intended to be “[the report] of the 
risks of ML and TF affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border activities.”134 It 
seems that the EU has finally recognized the volatility of the financial sectors among the Member 
States and now keeps its hand on the pulse of the newly emerging tendencies, such as 
cryptocurrencies or crowdfunding platforms due to their risky and unpredictable nature.135 
The customer due diligence has been amended as well. One of the oldest rules of the European 
AML Directives, i.e. the threshold of 15 000 EUR in cash transaction, experienced tightening – it 
was reduced to 10 000 EUR.136 Mathematically, the reduction constitutes one-third of the 
previous threshold. However, from the macroeconomic point of view, the inflation gradually 
reduced the value of 15 000 EUR. Obviously, the amount of 15 000 EUR in 2015 (the year of the 
adoption of the Fourth Directive) does not hold the same value as in 1991 (when the rule was 
originally created).137 The “real” value of 15 000 EUR in 1991 approximately equals to 28 000 
EUR as of late 2015 due to a constant increase in consumer prices.138 Ironically enough, the 
reduction of the threshold by one third in practice meant its historical diminution almost by three 
times. The reason to lower the threshold, however, is self-evident – the regulator wanted to 
increase control over the financial flows in the EU.  
An additional concern is the wording used in Article 2(3)(e), namely, “several transactions which 
appear to be linked”. As there is no harmonised definition of the “link” provided by the Directive, 
it creates ambiguity in the implementation of the provision.139 
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In AMLD4, simplified due diligence was amended in the spirit of the enhanced risk-based 
approach too. Under the Third Directive, SDD was supplemented with a quite lengthy list of 
automatically exempted entities, such as publicly traded companies or governmental 
institutions.140 Contrary to that, the Fourth Directive offers no such list, but instead implies 
individual risk assessment for every case. According to Article 15, decisions on the application of 
SDD now should be justified based on the risk-based evaluation and supported by appropriate 
documentation.141 
The new SDD based on individual case assessment is also backed by the risk factor provided in 
Annex II to the Directive.142 There are five main risk factors suggested by the non-exhaustive list: 
customer, product/service, transaction, delivery channel, and geographical risks.143 Interestingly, 
customer risk may be lowered by the fact that company is publicly listed, yet, this is just one of 
many factors that shall be taken into consideration. Likewise, governmental institutions are not 
anymore automatically exempt from the regular customer due diligence simply because of their 
status – they shall go through risk assessment anyway. 
Generally, it is considered to be a positive shift from the national interpretation of the rules to the 
detailed explanation of the rules within the Directive itself. It fosters harmonisation of the rules 
within the EU, reduces the vagueness, thus leaving less room for diverging interpretations. 
Finally, enhanced due diligence was treated in the more prescriptive way. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the “white list” has been abolished but, surprisingly, the “black list” has been 
introduced. As the name suggests, such list contains jurisdictions with absent or low AML/CTF 
policy.144 
Basically, EDD is now applicable in any case when customers from designated high-risk 
countries are processed.145 Additional factors to be examined are the same as for SDD: customer, 
product/service, transaction, delivery channel, and geographical risks.  
The Directive also provides examples of high-risk factors. For example, a customer who is 
involved in cash-intensive business shall be considered to be a potentially high-risk customer. 
Similarly, those residing in countries under EU/UN sanctions shall be considered high-risk 
customers as well.146 
A particular case of EDD – politically exposed persons – has also been amended in the spirit of 
the enhanced risk-based approach. In Article 3147, the definition of politically exposed persons 
has become elaborate, contrary to one in AMLD3. It gives a clear description of the concept of 
PEPs and, more importantly, provides a definition of family members and close associates, which 
was marked as troublesome in previous legislation.  
The new definition under AMLD4 broadens the notion and covers not only foreign PEPs (as has 
been the case before) but also introduces domestic PEPs, which goes in line with the 2012 FATF 
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Recommendations148 and Article 52 of the 2003 United Nations Convention against 
Corruption.149  
In practice, the above-described extension resulted in the need of the covered entities to re-
examine and reclassify its customers as well as apply additional EDD measures.150 Furthermore, 
Article 22 clarified the confusion with regard to the status of those PEPs who are no longer 
entrusted with a prominent public position: such persons shall be deemed to be PEPs and it is 
required to apply risk-sensitive procedures for at least 12 months and until such time when a 
person no longer poses risk associated with their political position.151 
6.4. Beneficial ownership 
The “25% rule of beneficial ownership” introduced in the AMLD3 was good on paper but faced a 
lot of difficulties in the application phase.152 The problems arising out of this rule even outweigh 
the benefits, especially when it comes to the complex structure of the entity. As a result, the 
identification of the beneficial ownership might depend on different technical factors outside 
AML/CTF policy, such as diverging opinions on interpretation, incoherent risk evaluations, etc. 
Additionally, when the structure of the company is complex and its owners are scattered across 
various jurisdictions, the outcome of the beneficial owner identification is unpredictable.153  
As it was found in the report on the implementation of the Third AML Directive, there are two 
options for how the Member States calculate beneficial ownership.154 Option one also referred to 
as “top down”, defines the beneficial owner as a person who possesses or controls at least 25% of 
customer’s share or property. Option two, referred to as “bottom up”, defines the beneficial 
owner as a person who possesses or controls at least 25% of customer’s share or property or if 
previous is not applicable, as any other entity that owns at least 25% of the customer. The second 
option requires more efforts to identify the beneficiary, as it aims at finding the “lowest” possible 
beneficial ownership. The ultimate choice, however, depends only on the interpretation of the 
Directive by the MS. To illustrate, 13 Member States followed the “top down” approach, whereas 
11 Member States followed the “bottom up”.155 
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Consequently, the differences in implementation of the Third Directive are hardly harmonised, 
and may even preclude the Member States from cooperation in AML field, as well as increase 
compliance expenses.  
In the Fourth Directive, it was considered vital to provide a common understanding of the 
concept of risk-based customer and of the beneficial ownership identification procedures in order 
to ensure stability and efficiency of AML policy.  
The impetus for the development of the beneficial ownership identification has traditionally been 
brought by FATF. According to the FATF Interpretive Note to the Recommendation 10, there are 
two main stages in the identification of the beneficial ownership. First is a natural person who 
controls more than 25% or more of the entity in question.156 If there are any doubts regarding the 
identified person, that is, whether the identified person is a real beneficiary or when there are no 
natural persons found at all, the institution shall search for other means to identify the 
beneficiary. The alternative solution in the case when natural persons are unidentifiable is that the 
institution shall identify the senior manager of such company and consider him or her to be the 
beneficial owner.157 
This new solution to the beneficial ownership identification suggested by FATF is truly in line 
with the enhanced risk-based approach, as the emphasis is set on finding natural persons and not 
on the shares/percentages in the entity. This is another example of the dynamic risk assessment 
rather than the static rulebook attitude.  
6.5. Beneficial ownership register 
As pointed above, under the Third AML Directive, collection of information needed for the 
beneficiary identification became problematic for the covered institutions. Fortunately, the Fourth 
Directive offers a solution for this issue by introducing the beneficial ownership register.  
The functions of such register are explained in paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article 30 of the 
AMLD4:  
Member States shall ensure that corporate and other legal entities incorporated within 
their territory are required to obtain and hold adequate, accurate and current information 
on their beneficial ownership, including the details of the beneficial interests held. 
Member States shall ensure that the information … is held in a central register in each 
Member State.158 
Thus, information stored in the register could be accessed by the competent authorities, FIUs and 
“any persons or organisation who can demonstrate legitimate interest.”159 Authorities and FIUs 
would certainly benefit from such an innovation, as this allows them to easily monitor ML/TF 
situation and access the needed financial information. According to Article 30(5), the content 
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ownership.pdf. Last accessed: 7 May 2018.  
157 FATF Recommendation of 2012, supra note 120, Interpretive note to Recommendation 10. 
158 Directive 2005/60/EC, supra note 77, Article 30(1) and Article 30(3).  
159 Ibid., Article 30(5).  
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includes the name, date of birth, nationality, country of residence and information of beneficial 
ownership percentages.160  
However, another group of persons to whom access might be granted is being introduced, 
namely, the persons who can demonstrate a “legitimate interest”. This, however, is a 
controversial solution.161 Although such information is not considered sensitive and could 
potentially be obtained from other sources, two things remain unclear: first, why would anyone 
apart from authorities need it, and, second, how exactly the legitimate interest would be 
verified.162  
The core principle of the Fourth AML Directive is that the risk-based approach remains valid 
even when the information has been already collected. This is enshrined in Article 30(8), which 
provides that, even though the information on the customer has already been collected and stored 
in the registers, the entities shall continue customer due diligence on these persons and could not 
refrain from repeated risk evaluation.163  
On the one hand, the beneficial ownership register is one of the few – if not the only – solution 
allowing to keep beneficiaries information updated and accessible to the institutions and relevant 
authorities. On the other hand, such registers somewhat alter the nature of the financial system, 
making it not just commercial but also surveillance actor. Further, information is stored in the 
electronic database, it could be attacked, resulting in vulnerable financial information misuse. 
To conclude, the Fourth AML Directive has put emphasis on transparency, cooperation, 
information exchange, enhanced monitoring procedures and a tailored approach towards 
customer identification and due diligence. 
Despite the fact that both the Third and the Fourth AML Directives pursue the same aim and 
apply the same approach, they are still somewhat different in nature. While the Third AML 
Directive is sometimes called revolutionary – which it truly is because of novelty it introduces – 
the Fourth Directive is of a more evolutionary character, as it deepens the notion of the risk-based 
approach, the central point of the next chapter.  
7. THIRD AND FOURTH AMLD: AN EVEN CLOSER LOOK AT THE RISK-
BASED APPROACH 
7.1. Methodology of risk evaluation  
The risk-based approach is the governing principle of the European AML/CTF policy since 2005. 
However, the genuine value to the risk-based approach is given by the prerequisites that have to 
be understood and implemented not only by the covered entities, but also by the regulator. 
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The first prerequisite is that the management of financial institutions is responsible for providing 
appropriate and proportionate risk evaluation systems. Appropriate, as it ensures that actions 
taken by the institutions during the due diligence procedure are adjusted to the specific type of 
business and to the clients’ activities. Proportionate, because institutions have to recognise that, 
as the risk increases, so shall the intensity of the measures to mitigate the risk. 164 
The second prerequisite is that each institution has to adapt its own risk evaluation system to the 
needs of the institution, making it unique. Before establishing AML/CTF system, the institution 
must analyse and understand the environment where it operates, i.e. its risk tolerance policy and 
the overall risk profile of the business. It is the choice of the institution to set their risk tolerance 
policy and hence apply lower AML/CTF measures comparing with competitors with lower risk 
tolerance. Such approach is in line with AML laws until the management of the financial 
institution can demonstrate and explain how their systems are proportionate and appropriate.165 
When prerequisites are in place, next component which distinguishes the risk-based approach 
from the rule-based one is risk profiling. In fact, the Fourth AML Directive contains several 
explicitly mentioned risk factors to be taken into consideration during the risk evaluation: 
customer risks, geographic area risks, product, service and transaction risk, and delivery channels 
risks.166 
Customer risks are those risks that are coming from the customer himself. It encompasses the 
source of the income, legal or natural person, NPO or PEPs status, past activity records, 
beneficial ownership structure, etc. Before the implementation of the risk-based approach, 
customer risks were the centre of customer identification, i.e. the only factor which has been 
analysed by the institution.  
High geographic area risk are the countries with weak legislation against AML/CTF, which pose 
a risk to the international anti-money laundering system. Alternatively, the risk might come from 
the high levels of corruption, terrorist activity, unstable political regime or when the jurisdiction 
is included in the FATF Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories list or sanctioned by UN or 
EU. It is the obligation of the financial institution to monitor the political/legal/economic 
condition of the country where its customers reside.167 
Products, services and transactions risks usually refer to the products and services stemming from 
innovative technologies, usually characterized by customer anonymity. For example, electronic 
money, international wire transfer or “stored value” cards offered by the non-financial institution. 
In turn, the financial institution shall evaluate transactions of such clients in order to quantify the 
amount of debit-credit operations, the direction of money flows as well as the category of the 
customer who uses non-financial organisation services. As for the transactions, the institution 
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should also assess the complexity of the operations made by the customer and verify the nature of 
such transactions: e.g., as high value, cash sensitive etc.168 
There are methods of provision of services or the product delivery lines which increase ML risks 
due to the fact that the business is very likely not to know the identity of the clients and not to 
understand their business activity. Therefore, the financial institution shall evaluate the amount of 
non-face-to-face transactions and involvement of intermediaries, as it increases ML risks as well. 
Importantly, a non-face-to-face transaction is not a high-risk factor itself. The risk would rather 
increase where the customer is new, as the financial institution would not know him and would 
need the time to decrease the level of risk as soon as the information confirming his activity 
would satisfy the institution. 169 
Under the risk-based approach, the emphasis is placed on the combination of the risk factors. 
This ensures measures to be proportionate and appropriate because the institution grounds its 
actions on the numerous characteristics of the customer. In comparison, the rule-based approach 
would rather stress the importance of the customer risk without analysing other factors that 
indeed have the same, or sometimes even greater importance, as the latter. Thus, instead of the 
rule-based approach one-dimensional risk matrix, the risk-based approach offers 
multidimensional risk evaluation, which tends to be more accurate in terms of resource allocation 
for the customer identification purposes. 170 
Whilst there are various ways to estimate risk and consequently come up with the risk profile of 
the customer, there are two variables which are considered to be the most generic way to do it, 
namely, likelihood and impact. One may argue that such model is simplistic, but using such two 
variables for a risk profile can be easily constructed. The two-dimensional matrix allows mapping 
of every risk factor: customer, product or any other, in order to establish the risk that financial 
institution is going to encounter.  
The matrix consists of four quadrants - A, B, C, and D respectively. The risk falling in lower-left 
quadrant A is the risk characterised by the low likelihood and the low impact of occurring. 
Hence, the financial institution’s efforts to mitigate such risks would be considered as wasted 
resources due to the fact that it will not result in the lower risk profile of the customer. Of course, 
it does not imply that the customer is totally risk-free, but rather that the risk would not affect the 
institution severely.171 
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The risks represented in the quadrants B and C are the high likelihood-low impact and high 
impact-low likelihood respectively. These quadrants are those threats, where the institution shall 
dedicate efforts to reduce the risk, otherwise it would move to the D quadrant.  
The high likelihood-high impact risk in quadrant D are the risks that most likely could not be 
mitigated at all. In order to achieve this, the financial institution would require implementing 
strict control measures that would eventually restrict most, if not all, business operations because 
of the ML/TF threat.  
Therefore, AML/CTF by its nature is not a fool proof process. In order to reduce failures, the 
institutions and regulators must implement dynamic controls and monitor their customers.  
The next chapter is dedicated to more advanced systems of the customer identification under the 
risk-based approach provided by the Fourth AML Directive.  
7.2. Risk management framework 
In the risk management framework, the evaluation of the risk factors described in the previous 
chapter is the first step in executing the risk assessment of the customer. In the modern 
AML/CTF terminology, it is usually referred to as inherent risk. According to the Wolfsberg 
Group, inherent risk represents the vulnerability of a customer to the ML/TF, sanctions or 
corruption activity in the absence of any control of the environment implemented.172 
As every financial institution has its unique balance of risk appetite and strategic objectives 
(profit, turnover, quality of customers, etc.), inherent risk evaluation may vary depending on the 
subjective model implemented by the institution. Nevertheless, the assessment procedure of the 
inherent risk basically constitutes scoring of each factor using the Low - Medium - High scale. 173 
Once the inherent risk is established, the financial institution shall assess the efficiency of the 
internal controls against the identified risks. There are various policies and control measures to 
protect the financial institution from the ML/CF threat and guarantee that the risk would be 
immediately identified. Examples of such controls are designated AML Compliance officers, 
developed KYC principles, AML/CTF training of the staff, etc. The evaluation of the internal 
policies allows an institution to estimate its efficiency and raise urgent actions to remedy the 
loopholes.174 
Similarly, as with inherent risk evaluation, the findings of each policy or control shall be scored, 
and when aggregated, represent the institutions’ strength of the organisations’ ML control. Not 
rarely, some of the categories are assigned with an additional weight based on the importance 
recognized by the institution.  
                                                
172 The Wolfsberg Group, Frequently Asked Questions on Risk Assessments for Money Laundering, Sanctions and 
Bribery & Corruption, p.18. Available at:  
https://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/sites/default/files/wb/pdfs/faqs/17.%20Wolfsberg-Risk-Assessment-FAQs-
2015.pdf. Last accessed: 7 May 2018.  
173 Karima Touil, “Risk-Based Approach Understanding and Implementation. Challenges between Risk Appetite and 
Compliance,” Acams Today (2016), p.10. Available at:  
http://files.acams.org/pdfs/2016/Risk-Based_Approach_Understanding_and_Implementation_K_Touil.pdf.  
Last accessed: 7 May 2018.  
174 The Wolfsberg Group, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 172, p.11.  
 35 
Once inherent risk and internal control have been analysed, the last step is evaluation of the 
residual risk. The residual risk is defined by the Wolfsberg Group as:  
the risk that remains after controls are applied to the inherent risk. It is determined by 
balancing the level of inherent risk with the overall strength of the risk management 
activities/controls. The residual risk rating is used to assess whether the ML risks within 
the FI are being adequately managed.175 
Therefore, the residual risk is crucial for the evaluation process, as it indicates whether ML/TF 
risks were properly managed by the financial institution and is measured depending on its 
available resources and capabilities. For example, there is the high-risk customer, but two 
financial institutions utilise different control and mitigation measures resulting in two different 
scenarios: first, high-risk but mitigated becoming low or medium-risk customer or, second, high-
risk customer, the risk of which is not mitigated due to the policy chosen by the institution. 
According to the residual risk evaluation, the financial institution chooses the type of the 
appropriate customer due diligence procedure: low-risk profiles – simplified due diligence, 
medium-risk profiles – regular customer due diligence, high-risk profiles – enhanced due 
diligence. Additionally, according to the residual risk evaluation, the results change the approval 
authority. In other words, if the customer is evaluated as having a high-risk profile, the financial 
institution would most likely require direct approval from the AML Committee, whereas for low-
risk customer, approval from the regular customer relationship manager would be sufficient. 176 
In practice, financial institutions analyse many factors: the example provided in the Annex is a 
good illustration of the results of such evaluation.177 Imagine there is a customer which resides in 
the United Arab Emirates, which is considered to be a low-risk country from the AML 
perspective, as there is effective AML/CTF policy in place. However, the company is registered 
in the British Virgin Islands, which is known as a tax haven and has weak control over 
companies. Further, the beneficial owner is Iranian. The customer’s operational business is 
import and export of gas/oil products from Iran, which is considered to be a high-risk activity due 
to the fact that Iran lacks AML/CTF legislation, has high level of corruption and is tied to 
terrorist financing. It is also known that ISIL was engaged in oil smuggling, using Iran and 
Kurdistan as an intermediary to sell through.178 The customer would like to ask for a letter of 
credit from the financial institution, which might be problematic due to the nature of the partners 
of such customer.  
Thus, the financial institution aggregates the results of the evaluation and scores the customer. In 
the given case, the institution sets the score of four, which is a high risk. Hence, enhanced due 
diligence procedure shall be applicable and, for the further cooperation, the approval from the 
senior manager is required. 
                                                
175 The Wolfsberg Group, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 172, p.19. 
176 Karima Touil, “Risk-Based Approach,” supra note 173, p.10. 
177 Annex 8. 
178 D. McElroy, “Iraq Oil Bonanza reaps $1 million a day for Islamic State; Exclusive: Islamic State strengthens grip 
on northern Iraq by raising millions from sale of oil through Kurdistan to Turkey and Iran”, The Telegraph, (2014). 
Available at:  
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10962160/Iraq-oil-bonanza-reaps1-million-a-day-for-
Islamic-State.html. Last accessed: 7 May 2018. 
 36 
7.3. Implications of the risk-based approach 
The European AML/CTF legislation and FATF Recommendations indeed contributed to the 
universal fight against ML/TF, however, they also had additional implications on the financial 
system.  
First, financial institutions became very demanding in terms of evidence confirming the low-risk 
nature of the customer: e.g., small firms with short history would rather be considered high-risk 
customers. Thus, financial institutions have the grounds to refuse to cooperate with such 
customer as, theoretically, it might be involved in ML/TF activity. 
Second, as already discussed in the previous chapters, the scope of the European AML Directives 
and obligations of organisations have been extended, which led to de-risking of the financial 
institutions. In other words, financial institutions cease the existing relationships with customers 
and close accounts because of a high risk of ML/TF. Today, the implementation of the de-risking 
can be seen in the Baltic region as well. The Latvian scandal, in which the banks were accused of 
the service provision to non-resident customers and dealing with transactions suspected of ML, 
resulted in large fines and liquidation of one the biggest banks in the country. To reduce ML/TF 
risks, Estonian financial institutions have decided to avoid serving foreign customers and close 
accounts of the existing ones.179 
Third, as the consequence of the complex AML regime in the European Union, there are many 
countries which are considered to be high-risk jurisdictions. This may preclude European 
businesses from entering into new regions and lead to isolation of the poorer countries beyond the 
frontier as well. Consequently, it would widen the AML legislation gap.180  
The last but probably the most important aspect of the European AML policy is the ratio of costs 
and benefits. The University of Utrecht in its report on the legal and economic effectiveness of 
the AML/CTF policy attempted to estimate the costs and benefits of AML/CTF policy per EU 
country.181 Of course, there are unknown variables, including moral components, which are hard 
to estimate, but the findings are truly stunning: the costs exceed the benefits by 8-9 times on 
average.  
Furthermore, the University of Utrecht estimated the costs and benefits for a theoretical country 
with 10 millions of population and a level of price equal to that in the U.S. It is seen that around 
50% of the costs are the burden for the private sector to maintain AML/CTF policy in place. It 
becomes obvious that the measures undertaken by the EU against money laundering are largely 
inefficient because the benefits (income from fines and confiscations) will never cover the 
expenses.182 
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Although the risk-based approach introduced a better customer identification and an enhanced 
risk management system, a truly effective implementation is not achieved yet. Strict rules of risk 
assessment as well as a small amount of benefits, especially for the private sector, question the 
need for such a demanding AML/CTF legislation. However, despite the risk-based approach 
materialized approximately a decade ago, it had not yet crystallized in the rigid structure, leaving 
the possibility that it will further develop, taking into account the implications that exist today.  
8. FIFTH AML DIRECTIVE: EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF AML/CTF REGIME 
IN EU 
The first proposal to the Fifth AML Directive was pronounced even before June 2017, the 
deadline for the implementation of the Fourth AML Directive. The rationale behind the urgency 
to amend the current AML/CTF legislation is the information found in the Panama Papers, which 
leaked in April 2016 as well as the belief that electronic money and prepaid cards were allegedly 
used by terrorists to finance the attacks in Paris in November 2015.183 As for Panama Papers, it 
revealed money laundering schemes used worldwide and served as a bad signal for the current 
AML/CTF legislation, as it might not impose effective and harmonized rules on due diligence 
procedures as well as perform detailed monitoring of the high-risk jurisdictions.  
According to European Parliament Committees Report, the personal scope of the next AML 
Directive, among minor changes, should be enlarged to introduce new enhanced control over 
electronic money and prepaid cards. It includes providers of the electronic money (such as 
Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc.) and its distributors, as well as providers of the exchange between 
electronic money and fiat currencies.184 It is proposed to include the providers of custodian 
wallets, which allow the final customer to access cryptocurrency markets, into the scope. The 
regulator’s intention to cover electronic money and cryptocurrencies is the result of the extensive 
popularity of such money in the recent years, especially in the fourth quarter of 2017, when 
capitalisation of the most popular cryptocurrency Bitcoin reached 237.62 billion U.S. dollars.185 
However, the ideology of cryptocurrencies – anonymity and decentralisation – might set a 
considerable barrier to the effective implementation of the future Directive. The Directives were 
traditionally created to provide financial institutions with a guidance to AML/CTF policy, but, if 
the scope is extended to cover cryptocurrencies-related businesses, the financial institutions 
might find it confusing and hardly applicable to the existing well-established financial sector.186  
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CONCLUSION  
The evolution of the European AML/CTF legislation provided in this Thesis187 shows that the 
transition from the rule-based to the risk-based approach was quite rapid: within one decade, a 
radical shift took place. One of the purposes of this Thesis was to identify the reasons for the 
change of European AML regime from the rule-based to the risk-based approach. 
The main reason for a quite rapid introduction of the risk-based approach is the apparent failure 
of the rule-based approach: the latter proved to be very formalistic and did not satisfy the needs 
of financial control. It contained loopholes that allowed money launderers to bypass the 
regulations, while the financial institutions applied the minimal effort approach.  
Second, the plurality of customer characteristics made rule-based “one-size-fits-all” approach 
obsolete and unable to adequately evaluate the risks and mitigate them. Third, the overall 
influence of globalisation somewhat accelerated the shift as well. 
Another purpose of this Thesis was to identify the benefits and implications of the new approach. 
The risk-based approach is much more efficient, comparing to the previous one. First, it allows 
for a smarter allocation of resources, where customers are categorised, and groups possessing 
higher level of risk are being granted bigger attention. Second, risk-based approach is much more 
flexible, as it provides different mechanisms of risk mitigation for different groups of customers 
as well as allows the entities to build their own mechanisms of risk assessment. Third, risk-based 
approach requires active involvement of the covered entities (such as constant customer re-
evaluation, creation of registers, etc.), which contributes to the overall security of the financial 
market. As to the implications, the risk-based approach is quite complex, comparing to the rule-
based approach, as it only gives general guidelines without providing concrete detailed 
procedures. Thus, the burden of creating such individual procedures lies on the financial 
institutions, which might become problematic in case when it would have to explain why it has 
chosen this particular method or procedure of risk assessment to the regulator. This also brings 
the problem of ambiguity: with no clear procedure provided by the regulator, financial 
institutions and Member States are in some aspects free to interpret and apply the legislation as 
they deem correct. Second, despite its efficiency, such approach remains very expensive for the 
private sector (see Annex 10).  
Finally, this Thesis aimed to identify how did the transition from the rule-based approach to risk-
based approach affect customer identification. 
To start with, risk-based approach introduced a new term – due diligence – which was divided 
into three groups according to the level of posed risk: simplified, regular, and enhance. Such 
categorisation allows to exercise stricter control over high-risk customers, which, as already 
noted above, leads to a wiser allocation of resources, as lower-risk customers are not being 
controlled in as high degree.  
Second, enhanced due diligence introduced the notion of politically exposed persons, which 
contributes to combating of corruption and bribery. Despite the fact that the term was not clear 
enough when introduced in the Third Directive and had to be clarified in the subsequent one, its 
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inclusion is still an advantage, as the previous – rule-based approach – did not have such specific 
measure at all.  
Third, the risk-based approach introduced a completely new understanding of the beneficial 
ownership: while, previously, it was enough to indicate the beneficial owner “on paper”, 
currently, the purpose is to find the ultimate beneficial owner, even if it requires enormous 
efforts.  
Finally, the risk-based approach offered risk scoring instead of the previously applied “checklist 
model”. Thus, instead of identifying whether the elements of the list are present, these elements 
are being individually evaluated, which makes the risk assessment multidimensional and more 
thorough. Thus, all elements are combined, and the whole assessment is no longer based on just 
one element but on aggregation of elements.  
Yet, the future prospects might not be as bright: as the brief analysis of the proposal of the Fifth 
AML Directive shows, much bigger emphasis is now being put on stricken of control over the 
financial actors with special attention being given to electronic money/prepaid cards. As Navin 
Beekarry points out,  
the more protected the financial system would be against this phenomenon [ML], the 
more money launderers would try to use alternative means to carry out their criminal 
activities. 188  
One may expect that regulation of the financial sector will continue to expand, as it was seen 
during the last 30 years of the AML/CTF development. New challenges, such as the 
decentralisation of financial systems, peer-to-peer platforms, initial coin offering (ICO), etc. will 
certainly disrupt the current market and function beyond the AML rules. However, contrary to 
the previous financial technologies, modern solutions put an emphasis on security and 
anonymity. Consequently, this may hinder the effective implementation of the laws, which might 
lead to a total ban from the regulator, in the same way as cryptocurrencies were banned in South 
Korea and China, due to high-risk nature of the such technology. 
By the same token, AML/CTF laws already led to the so-called de-banking phenomenon. As the 
financial institutions refuse to serve the customers, the world will face a formation of the 
financially isolated group of people, who are categorised as high-risk profile – for whatever 
reason – and cannot afford services of the banks with a high-risk tolerance policy.  
Today, risk assessment is done through the initial machine processing and subsequent manual 
evaluation, which requires considerable amount of labour and resources. It is evident that the 
future of the AML/CTF regulation lies in the automatisation and machine learning, as the risk-
evaluation systems become so much more complicated as well as multidimensional.  
It is highly possible that, at some point, the European legislation shall come up with the 
standardised algorithms that would perform the risk assessment automatically, that is, with 
minimum human interference. The idea to use algorithms is not new, but today it becomes 
possible to set up comprehensive self-learning system. The outcome of such automatization, 
however, would only be beneficial for the organisations and for compliance purposes, whereas 
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the customers would be constantly monitored without an option to cease the monitoring while 
still having an access to the financial system.  
Indeed, such tendencies are somewhat worrisome, as it looks that Anti Money Laundering is 
moving towards Combating Terrorism Financing and – even more – large-scale financial 
surveillance over customers, conducted on the part of the regulator, which might – and, 
apparently, would – go beyond the laundry rooms.  
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ANNEX 
Annex 1: Number of transactions per year (in billions) in the European 
Union.189 
 
Year Number of transactions (In Billions) Year Number of transactions (In Billions) 
2000 47.9 2009 81.72 
2001 50.86 2010 86.63 
2002 53.84 2011 90.61 
2003 58.31 2012 94.38 
2004 65.78 2013 99.95 
2005 69.02 2014 103.26 
2006 73.35 2015 112.47 
2007 75.33 2016 122.01 
2008 78.62 2017 No data available 
 
                                                
189 European Central Bank. Number of total payment transactions involving non-MFIs - from EU (changing 
composition). Available at: 
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browseSelection.do?type=series&q=PSS.A.D0.F000.I00.Z00Z.NT.X0.20.Z0Z.Z&node=SE
ARCHRESULTS&ec=&oc=&rc=&cv=&pb=&dc=&df=. Last accessed: 7 May 2018. 
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Annex 2: Functions and tasks of the FATF.190 
In order to fulfil its objectives, the FATF carries out the following tasks:  
1. Identifying and analysing money laundering, terrorist financing and other threats to the 
integrity of the financial system, including the methods and trends involved; examining 
the impact of measures designed to combat misuse of the international financial system; 
supporting national, regional and global threat and risk assessments; 
2. Developing and refining the international standards for combating money laundering and 
the financing of terrorism and proliferation (the FATF Recommendations); 
3. Assessing and monitoring its Members, through ‘peer reviews’ (‘mutual evaluations’) and 
follow-up processes, to determine the degree of technical compliance, implementation and 
effectiveness of systems to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism and 
proliferation; refining the standard assessment methodology and common procedures for 
conducting mutual evaluations and evaluation follow-up; 
4. Identifying and engaging with high-risk, non-cooperative jurisdictions and those with 
strategic deficiencies in their national regimes, and co-ordinating action to protect the 
integrity of the financial system against the threat posed by them; 
5. Promoting full and effective implementation of the FATF Recommendations by all 
countries through the global network of FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) and 
international organisations; ensuring a clear understanding of the FATF standards and 
consistent application of mutual evaluation and follow-up processes throughout the FATF 
global network and strengthening the capacity of the FSRBs to assess and monitor their 
member countries; 
6. Responding as necessary to significant new threats to the integrity of the financial system 
consistent with the needs identified by the international community, including the United 
Nations Security Council, the G-20 and the FATF itself; preparing guidance as needed to 
facilitate implementation of relevant international obligations in a manner compatible 
with the FATF standards (e.g., continuing work on money laundering and other misuse of 
the financial system relating to corruption); 
7. Assisting jurisdictions in implementing financial provisions of the United Nations 
Security Council resolutions on non-proliferation, assessing the degree of implementation 
and the effectiveness of these measures in accordance with the FATF mutual evaluation 
and follow-up process, and preparing guidance as needed to facilitate implementation of 
relevant international obligations in a manner compatible with the FATF standards; 
8. Engaging and consulting with the private sector and civil society on matters related to the 
overall work of the FATF, including regular consultation with the private sector and 
through the consultative forum; 
                                                
190 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Mandate of the Financial Action Task Force (2012-2020), p. 2. 
Available at:  
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FINAL%20FATF%20MANDATE%202012-2020.pdf. Last accessed: 
7 May 2018. 
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9. Undertaking any new tasks agreed by its Members in the course of its activities and 
within the framework of this Mandate; and taking on these new tasks only where it has a 
particular additional contribution to make while avoiding duplication of existing efforts 
elsewhere. 
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Annex 3: Development of the AML/CTF in the EU, the FATF, the UN and 
other organisations.191  
Year EU FATF UN Other 
1980    Measures Against the 
Transfer and 
Safekeeping of Funds 
of Criminal Origin 
(CoE) 
 
Offshore Group of 
Banking Supervisors 
(OGBS) 
1988   UN Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic 
Substances 
Statement of Principles 
(Basel Committee) 
1989  FATF founded   
1990  Original FATF 40 
Recommendations 
 Convention on 
Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and 
Confiscation of 
Proceeds from Crime 
(CoE) 
1991 First AML Directive 
(91/308/EEC) 
   
1992  1st Round of FATF 
Mutual Evaluations 
(start) 
  
1995    Creation of Egmont 
Group of Financial 
Intelligence Units 
1996  FATF 40 
Recommendations 
(revised) 
2nd Round of FATF 
Mutual Evaluations 
 Creation of IMoLIN 
                                                
191 Inês Sofia de Oliveira. “Anti-Money Laundering: the conditions for global governance and harmonisation,” supra 
note 67, p.270. 
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Annex 3: Cont. 
Year EU FATF UN Other 
1997 Action Plan to Combat 
Organised Crime (OJ 
C251, 15.08.1997) 
  CoE establishes 
MONEYVAL  
(as PC-R-EV) 
1998 Joint Action on 
Corruption in the 
Private Sector 
(98/742/JHA) 
 UN Political 
Declaration and Action 
Plan against Money 
Laundering 
OECD report on 
Harmful Tax Practices 
1999  2nd Round of FATF 
Mutual Evaluations 
  
2000 Council Decision 
concerning 
arrangements for 
cooperation between 
financial intelligence 
units of the Member 
States in respect of 
exchanging 
information 
(2000/642/JHA) 
FATF Report on 
NCCT 
UN Convention 
against Transnational 
Organized Crime and 
the Protocols Thereto 
Wolfsberg Global 
Anti-Money 
Laundering Guidelines 
for Private Banking 
 
2001 Second AML 
Directive 
(2001/97/EC) 
 
All EU States have 
FIUs 
FATF 8 Special 
Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing 
 US PATRIOT Act 
Basel Committee 
Issues Report on 
Customer Due 
Diligence 
2003 Council Framework 
Decision on Money 
Laundering, the 
Identification, tracing, 
freezing, seizing and 
confiscation of 
instrumentalities and 
the proceeds of crime 
(2001/500/JHA) 
FATF 
Recommendations 
(revised) 
UN Convention 
Against Corruption 
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Annex 3: Cont. 
Year EU FATF UN Other 
2004  3rd Round of FATF 
Mutual Evaluations 
  
2005 Third AML Directive 
(2005/60/EC) 
  
 
Convention on 
Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and 
Confiscation of 
Proceeds 
from Crime and on the 
Financing of Terrorism 
(CoE) 
2006 Regulation (EC) No 
1781/2006 on 
information on the 
payer accompanying 
transfers of funds 
   
2012  FATF 
Recommendations 
(revised) 
  
2014  4th Round of FATF 
Mutual Evaluations 
  
2015 Fourth AML Directive 
(Directive 2015/849) 
   
2016 Communication from 
the Commission to the 
European Parliament 
and the Council on an 
Action Plan for 
Strengthening the 
Fight Against Terrorist 
Financing  
COM (2016) 50 Final 
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Annex 4: Hypothetical structure of an entity, where beneficial ownership 
identification is complicated.192 
 
  
                                                
192 Indranil Ganguli. “The Third Directive”, supra note 108, p. 5.  
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Annex 5: Annual inflation in the European Union (1991 - 2015).193  
Inflation in the European Union as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage 
change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed 
or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used. 
Year Inflation, 
consumer prices 
(annual %) 
Value of  
15 000 EUR 
 
Year Inflation, 
consumer 
prices (annual 
%) 
Value of  
15 000 EUR 
 
1991 - 15000 2004 2.3 22709 
1992 5.1 15762 2005 2.5 23273 
1993 4.6 16488 2006 2.6 23879 
1994 4.7 17264 2007 2.6 24508 
1995 4.3 18002 2008 4.2 25538 
1996 3.3 18604 2009 1.0 25781 
1997 2.7 19097 2010 1.7 26212 
1998 2.4 19557 2011 3.3 27079 
1999 2.2 19981 2012 2.7 27815 
2000 3.2 20611 2013 1.4 28201 
2001 3.2 21261 2014 0.2 28264 
2002 2.3 21752 2015 -0.1 28247 
2003 2.1 22208  
 
  
                                                
193 Inflation, consumer prices (annual %). International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and data 
files. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG 
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Annex 6: Methods of beneficial ownership calculation.194 
 
  
                                                
194 EBA, ESMA and EIOPA. Report on the legal, regulatory and supervisory implementation, supra note 149, p.10. 
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Annex 7: Risk profiling matrix.195 
 
 
  
                                                
195 Marcus Killick. “Implementing AML/CFT measures” that address the risks and not tick boxes”, supra note 19, p. 
212. 
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Annex 8: Risk residuals.196 
Risk Factors Risk Description Description Risk Rating 
Customer type Nature of the 
customer 
General trading company 
dealing in export and 
import of Oil and Gas 
4 
AML 
screening 
result 
AML screening result 
that in case of a match 
against SDN name or 
in relation to a 
financial crime 
Customer being involved 
in Iran trading 
5 
Nationality 
/Country of 
incorporation 
Country where the 
company is registered 
or incorporated 
British Virgin Island 4 
Country of 
residence 
Country where the 
company is residing 
United Arab Emirates 1 
Business 
Activity 
Type of business 
activities involved 
Export and Import 4 
UBO Ultimate beneficial 
owner nationality 
Iran 4 
Partners Partner nationality Iran 4 
Financial 
Products & 
Services 
Type of banking 
product (to be) used 
by the customer 
LC facility 3 
Remarks: Risk Scoring 4 
Approval Authority Senior Manager 
Due diligence level EDD 
 
                                                
196 Karima Touil. “Risk-Based Approach,” supra note 167, p.18. 
 52 
Annex 9: Estimated annual cost and benefit analysis of AML/CTF policy in 
the EU by country.197 
 
  
                                                
197 Brigitte Unger, Henk Addink. Project ‘ECOLEF’ The Economic and Legal Effectiveness of Anti Money 
Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing Policy, p. 304. 2013. Available at: 
http://www2.econ.uu.nl/users/unger/ecolef_files/Final%20ECOLEF%20report%20%28digital%20version%29.pdf. 
Last accessed: 7 May 2018. 
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Annex 10: Estimates of the annual cost and benefits of AML/CTF policy.198 
 
  
                                                
198 Brigitte Unger, Henk Addink. Project ‘ECOLEF’, supra note 191, p. 303. 
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